We investigate a generalization of the notion of XML security view introduced by Stoica and Farkas (Proceedings of the 16th International Conference on Data and Applications Security (IFIP'02). IFIP Conference Proceedings, vol. 256, pp. 133-146. Kluwer, Dordrecht, 2002) The model consists of access control policies specified over DTDs with XPath expressions for data-dependent access control. We provide the notion of security views characterizing information accessible to authorized users. This is a transformed DTD schema that can be used by users for query formulation. We develop an algorithm to materialize an authorized version of the document from the view and an algorithm to construct the view from an access control specification. We show that our view construction combined with materialization produces the same result as the direct application of the DTD access specification on the document. We also propose a number of generalizations of possible security policies and show how they affect view construction algorithm. Finally, we provide an evaluation of our system.
Introduction
XML [12] has become the prime standard for data representation and exchange on the Web. In light of the sensitive nature of many business data applications, this also raises the important issue of security in XML and the selective exposure of information to different classes of users based on their access privileges.
To address such security issues, there is a need for a generic, flexible security model that can effectively support multiple policies for controlling access to XML content at various levels of granularity. Perhaps even more importantly, enforcing such access-control policies should not imply any drastic degradation in either performance or functionality for the underlying XML query-execution engine. In addition, access-control enforcement should not complicate the maintenance of the consistency and integrity of the data when either the XML data or the access policies are updated.
An XML security model must support 1. a simple and powerful fine grained authorization mechanism that can control access to both content and structure (e.g., restricting access to entire subtrees or specific elements in the document tree based on their content or location); 2. efficient mechanisms for the enforcement of security policy without fully annotating the underlying document to decouple data management from policy management; 3. schema information, characterizing all and only those elements accessible to each authorized user, in the same way that a relational database offers security views to their users.
An access control should not inhibit schema availability, i.e., the availability of necessary schema information (e.g., DTD [12] or an XML Schema [21] ) specifying the structure of the accessible data. Furthermore, XML documents are typically accompanied by a schema that specifies the internal structure of the data. For the same reasons that a database schema is needed for query formulation and processing for traditional databases, XML schemas are also important for XML query formulation and optimization; and schemas are critical for XML data exchange and integration [4] .
While specifications and enforcement of access control are well understood for traditional databases [20, 35, 41, 43] , the study of security for XML is less established. Early security models that have been proposed for XML do not meet criteria 3 mentioned above and, to a lesser extent, criterion 1 and 2. In particular, cryptographically enforced access control to XML documents [10, 37] considers only protection of XML data but not a schema; different parts of the XML tree are encrypted by different keys (typically one key for a particular combination of access control rules applicable to an XML element); finally, these kinds of protection make querying difficult since a large amount of decryption is needed. Run-time policy evaluation scenarios [10, 32] , requires policy propagation from the root to the requested node. This may result in calculation of accessibility decisions for every node test of the user query. Such a time-consuming query answering can be improved only partly in the presence of DTD [14, 39] , but it happens not for all queries. Other optimization techniques rely on compressed accessibility map [30, 51, 52] , or combining access control policy with user queries [36] . However, the user still does not have the schema of accessible data. This problem was slightly resolved in Bertino and Ferrari [9] , Damiani et al. [17] , where a "loosened" variant (i.e., DTD where every forbidden element is "optional") of the schema is delivered. The problem with the loosened version is that it still reveals all element names, including sensitive ones, of the initial DTD. Moreover, the overall security policy enforcement is performed at the document level by fully annotating the entire XML document/database; this requires possibly expensive view materialization (see Sect. 10), and complicates consistency and integrity maintenance.
In addition, fixing the access control policies at the instance level without providing or computing a schema makes it difficult for the security officer to understand how the authorized view of a document for a user or a class of users actually looks like. Hence, such a solution is hardly practical for large and complex documents. Revelation of excessive schema information might lead to security breaches: an unauthorized user can deduce or infer confidential information via multiple queries (essentially if the authorization specifications are not closed under intersection) and analyze the schema even if only accessible nodes are queried.
To overcome the limitations outlined above, the notion of an XML security views was initially proposed by Stoica and Farkas [44] and later refined by Fan et al. [22] . The basic idea is to provide a schema that describes the data that can be seen by the user, as well as a (hidden) set of XPath expressions that describes how to compute the data in the view from the original data.
Our contribution
This paper is an extension of our previous work [33] . In this section, we list our contribution not only w.r.t. the existing proposals of an XML access control research, but also w.r.t. [33] .
Our first contribution is an investigation of different alternatives for policy definition and enforcement at the level of an XML tree (Sect. 4). Our analysis shows that not all combinations of policy options satisfy the properties of completeness and consistency, i.e., some policy settings do not result in a single fully annotated tree. We provide a classification of policies using different options of security label propagation and conflict resolution. The comparison of our policy framework with those of the existing proposals is done in Sect. 11.
Second, we generalize the notion of XML security views from [22, 44] to arbitrary DAG DTDs and to conditional constraints defined in a very expressive XPath fragment. For each view, a security specification is a simple extension of the DTD document D with security annotations and security policies exploited to automatically obtain a full annotation from a partial one. The security views proposed in Stoica and Farkas [44] in some sense are smarter than ours since they can preserve semantic associations among some XML tags. For this purpose, corresponding cover stories are selected by a security officer, but they need human intervention. However, neither full DTD labeling derivation nor querying is discussed in Stoica and Farkas [44] .
Our third contribution is related to view derivation algorithm. Namely, we show a generic algorithm that constructs a fully annotated DTD D F (from the partial security specification) for different policies so that D F reflects a full annotation of a corresponding XML document. From this full specification, we derive a security view S consisting of a view DTD D v and a function σ defined via XPath queries. The view DTD D v shows only the data that are accessible according to the specification. The view is provided to the users so that they can formulate their queries over the view. The function σ is withheld from the users, and is used to extract accessible data from the actual XML documents to populate a structure conforming to D v . The formal proof of correctness of view derivation algorithm is also given.
In contrast to Fan et al. [22] , we consider general XML DTDs defined in terms of regular expressions rather than normalized DTDs. Furthermore, we do not allow dummy element types in the definition of security views. The latter are equivalent of optional elements in a loosened DTD of Damiani et al. [17] . In addition, algorithm presented in Fan et al. [22] is only top-down with a different semantics for qualifier, while our solution can compute views both for topdown and for bottom-up policies. Next, Fan et al. did not show how to construct fully annotated DTD D F . The latter can be extensively exploited, for example, in run-time policy evaluation scenarios when D F is calculated for a requesting user once for session and all further accessibility checks are done on D F . Finally, in Fan et al. [22] , it was claimed that view materialization is not needed since it is time-consuming and can be avoided by means of query rewriting technique. However, in many applications, views can remain unchanged for a long period of time and, hence, can be queried directly without query rewriting. Moreover, query rewriting may introduce complicated qualifiers, and thus evaluation of them may lead to exponential response time. Guided by these observations, we provide an algorithm for view materialization. Our approach is depicted summarily in Fig. 1 . We also show that materialized XML views conform to D v and are isomorphic to authorized ones. This is our fourth contribution.
Finally, as the fifth contribution, we provide an experimental evaluation of our system.
Plan of the paper
The paper is organized as follows. First we present preliminary notions on XML and XPath in Sect. 3. In Sect. 2 we provide a motivating example. After classification of security policies with respect to consistency and completeness properties in Sect. 4, we provide a formalization of the motivating example for top-down policy in Sect. 5, followed by the algorithm of view materialization in Sect. 6, and DTD view derivation in Sect. 7. An extension of view construction algorithm is given in Sect. 8. Next, investigation on theoretical aspects of our algorithms are provided in Sect. 9 and evaluation of the system is done in Sect. 10. Related work is reviewed in Sect. 11. Finally, we conclude the paper in Sect. 12.
A motivating example
We start with a running example assuming an intuitive understanding of XML documents as trees and DTDs as DAGs.
Example 1
We describe a DTD database containing the information on applications for PhD/MS program. Each application is initiated by a student described via studentdata with an element id uniquely identifying the student and representing the student's login name. Student-data are composed of name, desired degree (PhD or MS) department, and waiver. The latter field may take values "true" or "false" 1 and means that the student does (does not) waive his/her right to inspect the content of the recommendation letters. The application is supported by several letters of recommendation (recomm-letter); some of them can be classified as letter body and are provided with a separate evaluator having name, title and institution attributes. The evaluator places comments on the applicant's skills in free-text field, which is either a PDF or a TXT file, and rates applicant's English proficiency, and possible contributions to PhD or MS program. Letters of recommendation are reviewed by the admission committee and are assigned to a category favorable or unfavorable depending on the context. The corresponding DTD graph is depicted in Fig. 2 , where solid lines represent concatenation (i.e., AND-relation between a node and its children), dashed lines represent disjunction (i.e., OR-relation), and combined line, called nesting represent mix of relations between a node and its child nodes (in Fig. 2 , rating has child English and either MS or PhD). Stars on lines represent zero-to-many cardinality between a node and its child of a certain type. Figure 3a shows an XML document conforming to this DTD, where boxed leaves of the tree represent text values. Gray labels on some edges of this XML will be explained later.
The need to provide users with a schema-level security view is illustrated by the access control requirements in Example 2.
Example 2 An applicant can access his/her personal record located under the field student-data. Access to fields favorable and unfavorable is forbidden, while the visibility of rating and free-text is possible if the waiver is false (data-dependent access). Moreover, the applicant should not be aware of the reliability of the recommendation letters as the leakage of this information to recommenders might lead to embarrassing situations. Finally, we require the field department to be visible in any case: either from a proper student's application or from external one. Thus, the student will be able to see how many applications are submitted to different departments of the university. Hence, a ranking of departments can be inferred.
Corresponding qualifiers are shown in Fig. 3a as gray labels on edges. The meaning of the labels is given in the following: Y means always accessible, N means always forbidden, while q 1 , . . . , q 13 are encoded in XPath and presented in Fig. 3b . In these qualifiers, $login is a variable that is instantiated dynamically during the login into the system. So, if $login is "dkonovalov" then q 1 , q 3 , q 5 −q 10 are evaluated to be true, q 2 , q 4 , q 11 −q 13 are evaluated to be false. If the value of $login is "vromanov" then the situation is the contrary.
Existing cryptographical proposals like [9, 37] as well as run-time policy evaluation scenarios [10, 14, 32, 36, 39] , and view-based approaches [9, 17] enforce such security constraints directly on the XML document. The DTD is usually used only for typing of the XML document with security labels which are then propagated over the entire document through corresponding document portions. These systems specify how to restrict access at the data level and how to obtain authorized view of data.
Example 3
Let us construct an authorized view for Vladimir Romanov using some other well-known access control models.
-Author-X by Bertino et al. [7] does not support qualifiers, so we assume that a preprocessing step of their algorithm evaluating qualifier with the following semantics: if q is evaluated as true, the label is Y (i.e., permitted for access), otherwise N (i.e., forbidden for access). In the case of Vladimir Romanov, q 1 , q 3 , q 5 , . . . , q 10 are evaluated as false, and q 2 , q 4 , q 11 , . . . , q 13 are evaluated as true. Next, we assume that the propagation option is CASCADE [7] (i.e., top-down to all subelements) and deny takes precedence in the case of conflicts. The approach also relies on denial downward consistency rule that deletes everything that is below Nlabeled node. The view for Vladimir Romanov is shown in Fig. 4a . It contains only the student's personal information and looks fine. However, if Vladimir Romanov did not waive his right to see the content of recommendation letters, he would not have an access to this information anyway, because ann(recomm-letter, letter) = N. Selective dissemination [9] is a crypto-version of the Author-X which promotes a push architecture. The difference is that negative authorizations are not supported. However, everything that is not permitted is forbidden which is, basically, local closed policy. This means that if some XML subtree rooted at node n cannot be decrypted by a set of keys owned by the user, neither can any of its subtrees. Hence, the same view can be extracted as in the previous case. Ranking among departments is missing because of denial downward consistency rule as well. 
-Access control processor by Damiani et al. [17] . The preprocessing step mentioned previously is already included in the algorithm. The rule most specific takes precedence (which simply says that an unlabeled node takes the security label of its first labeled ancestor/descendant) is used for resolving conflicts. Finally, forbidden nodes are deleted if they do not have permitted children; otherwise only their attributes are cleaned. Such a policy enforcement results in Vladimir's view depicted in Fig. 4b . Sensitive field unreliable is visible because it has the permitted child recomm-letter. If the waiver had value true, sensitive fields favorable and unfavorable would be revealed as well. -Security views by Fan et al. [22] . Although [22] does not discuss XML view materialization, we tried to emulate their schema-level enforcement at the XML instance. The view of Vladimir Romanov is the same as in the first case. If we imagine that Vladimir Romanov does not waive his right to see the content of recommendation letters, the XML view presented in Fig. 4c has the element dummy that may suggest to the user an idea that something is hidden. Ranking among departments is still missing.
As we have seen above, none of these methods produces a correct XML view. Author-X hides too much information that should have been available for the user and sometimes reveals sensitive information in a meaningless way. The access control processor by Damiani et al., on the contrary, reveals too much information. The last method is better, but some information is still missing due to inappropriate qualifier semantics that deletes a subtree rooted at a node where the qualifier does not hold.
Example 4
Figures 5a, b are the authorized views retrieved from the document in Fig. 3a . In particular, Dmitry Konovalov has login dkonovalov and does not waive his right to see recommendation letters supporting his application (i.e., waiver = false), while Vladimir Romanov has login vromanov and waiver = true in his case. Both users also may infer the ranking among departments of the university since their views include department elements of all the other applications.
An important question remains unanswered: what schema information should be provided to the user? To formulate and process queries, the user needs a schema describing the accessible data. One solution, suggested by Damiani et al. [17] , is to loosen the original DTD (make forbidden nodes optional). In some cases, it is unacceptable to expose even the loosened DTD to final user. 
where str is a special type denoting PCDATA, is the empty word, and "+", ",", and " * " denote disjunction (or choice container), concatenation (or sequence container), and the Kleene star, respectively. We call A → P( A) as the DTD production rule of A. For all element types B occurring in P( A), we refer to B as a child type of A and to A as a parent type of B.
In the spirit of Stoica and Farkas [44] , our DTD definition allows mixed containers (e.g., choice container may include sequence subcontainer, etc.) and do not require any normal form as in Fan et al. [22] , where it was claimed that any DTD may be normalized. However, no algorithm on normalization/unnormalization was provided. 2 Example 5 According to Definition 1, the formal representation of the database from Example 1 is the following. The DTD D is defined as (Ele, P, db), where db = applications Ele = {applications, application, student-data, department, degree, waiver, name, recomm-letter, evaluator, title, institution, id, letter, rating, English, MS, PhD, free-text, PDF, TXT, unreliable, reason, favorable, unfavorable}; and the function P is the following (we omit the definition of elements whose type is str):
2 Although we may assume that normalization can be carried via additional intermediate nodes (e.g., rating has two children: English and a normalization node normalizing_node with two children PhD and MS), the role of these nodes during policy enforcement, DTD view querying and query rewriting presented in Fan et al. [22] is not clear.
P(applications)
= (application*) P(application) = (student-data, recomm-letter*, unreliable*) P(student-data) = (department, degree, waver, name, id) P(recomm-letter) = (evaluator, letter) P(evaluator) = (name, title, institution)
An XML document is typically modeled as a node-labeled tree. We call T an instance of D if T conforms to D.
Next, we consider a class of XPath queries that corresponds to the CoreXPath of Gottlob et al. [26] augmented with the union operator and atomic tests and which is denoted by Benedict et al. [5] as X .
The XPath axes we consider as primitive are child, parent, ancestor-or-self, descendant-OrSelf, self. Gottlob et al. [26] show how the semantics of such axes can be computed in polynomial time. In the sequel we denote by θ one of the primitive axes and by θ −1 its inverse. Notice that each primitive axis has its inverse within the same set of primitives. For instance, descendant− Or − Self, −1 = ancestor-or-self. where θ stands for an axis, c is a str constant, A is a label, op stands for one of =, <, >, ≤, ≥. The result of the qual filtering is called qualifier and is denoted by q. We denote by X NoTest the fragment built without the path op c test.
For the sake of readability, we ignore the difference between x path and path; we denote both with p. We also abbreviate self by , The semantics of XPath is obtained by adapting to our fragment the S → , S ← , E operators proposed by Gottlob et al. [26] and is identical to the proposal of Benedickt et al. [5] . Intuitively S → [| p|] (N ) gives all nodes that are reachable from a node in N using the path p. The S ← [| p|] functions gives all nodes from which a path p starts to arrive at the queried node. The E [|q|] function evaluates qualifiers and returns all nodes that satisfy q.
For the sake of readability we overload the θ -symbol to stand for both the semantics and the syntax of axes. So, given a set of nodes N of a document T we have θ(N ) = {m | n θ m for n ∈ N }. In other words, θ(N ) returns the nodes that are reachable according to the axis from a node in N . By T (A) we denote the set of nodes that have element type A. By T ( * ) we denote all nodes of a document. By 1. Evaluate qualifiers top down starting from the root and replace annotations by Y or N depending on the result; 2. For each unlabeled node, label it with -the annotation of its nearest labeled ancestor; or -the annotation of its nearest labeled descendants applying value conflict resolution policy; or -the local propagation value; 3. Delete all nodes labeled with N from the result, making all children of a deleted node v into children of v's parent.
The annotation of the document, before deleting nodes in the last step, is called the full annotation of T .
We present different policies to extend a partial annotation of the XML document to a full one. There are a number of alternatives. Although top-down propagation is considered to be the most natural in many applications [7, 17, 19, 36] , there are other proposals that consider also bottom-up propagation of security labels [31, 32] .
Our security model is based on a specific policy, used for determining a complete authorization specification of a document based on a partial specification. This is the mostspecific-takes-precedence (MSTP) policy [20] . Different applications may have different requirements, and we now look at alternative approaches.
We can classify security policies using two orthogonal classifications that focus on completeness and consistency [20] . The first classification is based on how one handles unassigned values, while the second is based on the handling of conflicting assignments and how one restores consistency.
We are interested only in policies that are complete and consistent:
Definition 5 A policy is complete and consistent if every partially annotated tree can be extended to a fully annotated tree.
To capture the variety of policy propagation and conflict resolution options we have identified the following framework:
Local Propagation Policy (LP): "open", "closed", or "none"; Hierarchy Propagation Policy (HP): "topDown" (td), "bottomUp" (bu), or "none"; Structural Conflict Resolution (SC): "localFirst" (lf), "hierarchyFirst" (hf), or "none"; Value Conflict Resolution (VC): "denialTakesPrecedence" (dtp), "permissionTakesPrecedence" (ptp), or "none".
The LP option is similar to traditional policies for access control: in the case of "open", if a node is not labeled N then it is labeled by Y; in the case of "closed", a node not labeled Y is labeled by N; finally, the "none" option says that a node is not labeled.
The HP option specifies node annotation inheritance. In the case of "td", an unlabeled node with a labeled parent inherits the label of its parent. In the case of "bu" an unlabeled node inherits the label from labeled children. The "none" option says that no hierarchy propagation is applied. Note that the "bu" case can result in conflicts, and they should be addressed by the VC Resolution Policy.
The SC option specifies whether the local or the hierarchy rule takes precedence ("lf" or "hf" respectively); while "none" means that the choice depends on the values and on the VC option. The latter specifies how to resolve conflicts for unlabeled nodes that are assigned different labels by the preceding rules: N always has precedence over Y ("dtp"); Y always has precedence over N ("ptp"), and no choice ("none").
We list here several possible policies. These are variations of classical security policies that are used in other settings [20] :
-either permission-takes-precedence or denial-takes-precedence together with either the closed or open policy; In the sequel, we show some sufficient conditions for complete and consistent policy combinations. We represent all the possible policy options in Table 1 , where symbol " * " means "any", i.e., any possible value from a related domain (see column headers of Table 1 ). Note that Table 1 reflects all 81 possible combination of security options, since symbols * and = in columns HP, LP, SC, and VC mean, respectively, three and two possible values for the corresponding policy option.
Definition 6 A policy is called top-down/bottom-up/local
policy if it satisfies the conditions in lines 1-2/3-4/5-6 respectively of Table 1 .
Proposition 1 The top-down, bottom-up and local policies are complete and consistent.
In some cases both HP and LP policies are defined, but SC policy is "none". Hence, we apply both HP and LP thus obtaining for each node more than one security annotation. The result is defined by means of VC policy which should defined, i.e., the conditions in line 7 of Table 1 should be satisfied.
Definition 7
A policy is called a multilabel policy if it satisfies the conditions in line 7 of Table 1 .
Proposition 2 The multilabel policy is complete and consistent.
Proof The proof follows from the completeness and consistency of the hierarchical and local policies along with value conflict resolution option defined. All the other policies are classified as unresolvable. Indeed, policies following the condition 8 are incomplete, because neither HP nor LP is applied which results in the fact that unlabeled nodes are not assigned any label; policies in lines 9 and 10 are inconsistent because either the "winning" label in multilabel case is not provided (line 9) or value conflict which arises in the case of "bu" policy propagation is not resolved (line 10); policy in line 11 may be either inconsistent (some XML leaves are not defined; therefore, "bu" propagation is inconsistent) or incomplete (all leaves are defined but have different labels; therefore, value conflict arises and cannot be resolved).
So far, we have defined five classes of policies: local policy, top-down policy, bottom-up policy, multilabel policy, and unresolvable policy class. These classes were identified based on particular combinations of policy options for value propagation (hierarchy or local) and conflict resolution (structural and value).
The algorithm of policy class identification is presented in Fig. 7 ).
In the next sections, we will develop a method that enforces access control on DTD schema emulating XML-based propagation.
Schema access control for top-down policies
For each user group, an access specification is defined to be a partial mapping ann such that for each production A → α in D and each element type B in α, ann(A, B) is either Y or N or an XPath qualifier [q], denoting that the B child of an A element is accessible, inaccessible, or conditionally accessible depending on [q], respectively. Fig. 8 , we show an example of security specification described in Example 2: paths to unconditionally allowed (forbidden) element types from their corresponding parents are marked with Y(N), and conditionally accessible element types are marked by qualifiers q 1 , q 2 and q 3 (Fig. 8b) . In particular, elements unreliable and letter are forbidden to everybody, while information on department is unconditionally allowed in spite of conditional accessibility (q 1 ) of its ancestor application that is permitted if the students's login is the same as the id field of the underlying student node. Next, q 2 permits access to recomm-letter element if it is a descendant of a permitted application, q 3 reveals subtrees rooted at rating and free-text if the latter are descendants of a permitted application having waiver="true". In all three qualifiers, $login is a dynamic variable that is assigned at run time and equals the student's login name. (D, ann) , where D is a DTD, ann is a partial mapping such that, for each top-down edge (A, B), ann(A, B), if defined, is an annotation of the form: Fig. 8 , ann(application, unreliable) = N defines a source application, destination unreliable and a generator (application, unreliable) of a security label N for unreliable.
Example 6 In

Definition 8 An authorization specification S is a pair
Intuitively, labeling an edge (A, B) with an unconditional annotation is a security constraint expressed at the schema level: Y or N indicates that, in the case of top-down propagation, the corresponding B child of an A element in an XML document is always accessible (Y) or always inaccessible (N), no matter what the actual values of these elements in the document are. If ann(A, B) is not explicitly defined, then B inherits the accessibility of A or obtains a label from the default policy. On the other hand, if ann(A, B) is explicitly defined it overrides the accessibility of B obtained via propagation (Fig. 9 ).
Security views for top-down policies
From a specification as presented in the previous subsection, we would like to infer a DTD view D v which represents a schema of available data for the user. We use a set of XPath queries showing how to construct D v from the initial DTD D. We call this set of XPath expressions σ -function.
At this point, it would be interesting to continue the comparison of our view with those of proposals in [7, 17] , and Fan et al. [22] . Namely, the first one does not consider any schema information and reveals the intial DTD to the user as it is. Obviously, this strategy will leak too much sensitive information and hence is not reliable. Damiani's loosened version of the DTD is the original DTD with optional cardinality "?" on every edge that was not of cardinality zero-or-many " * ". It slightly alleviates the problem of the previous approach but not enough. Finally, the DTD view constructed according to the algorithm in Fan et al. [22] is shown in Fig. 10 . Namely, edge (applications, department) is missing and two dummy elements are introduced instead of favorable and unfavorable. Finally, recomm-letter is added to the view with X P 2 = (unreliable ∪ )/recomm-letter. However, if ann(application, recomm-letter) were N then recomm-letter would have been missing from the DTD view in all although q 4 allowed an access to it. This is because in DFS traversal of the DTD graph in Fan et al. [22] , the negative authorization would have arrived to recommletter before q 4 from unreliable. It means that recomm-letter would have been immediately substituted with its children.
In the following, the view is provided to the users so that they can formulate their queries over the view. This means that the users can only access data via D v . At the same time, the function σ is withheld from the users, and is used by Example 8 Figure 9 shows the view DTD D v which represents accessible data according to Example 2, and σ -function expressed by means of XPath expressions X P 1 -X P 5 . In particular, X P 1 says that only nodes of type application with student's id equal to student's login are included in the view. X P 2 and X P 3 skip all forbidden elements on the path from recomm-letter to, respectively, rating and free-text that are the children of accessible application (condition q 3 ), X P 4 extracts all recomm-letter, including unreliable ones. Finally, X P 5 collects all departments, even those that are located in forbidden parts of the tree. Drawing an analogy between relational databases and XML, we elaborate a method of XML view materialization using the σ -function so that the XML view conforms to the DTD view D v .
Example 9
It is easy to see that the views for Dmitry Konovalov and Vladimir Romanov, presented in Example 2 conform to the DTD view of Example 8.
The derivation of a materialized XML view is explained in the next definition: A classical question for relational database research, namely whether a view produced by the Materialize algorithm is actually populated by some instances is true. Since the root of the document is always labeled Y, the materialized view always has at least one node. We can show that for XPath fragment, the algorithm is efficient. Let f (n, d) be the complexity of evaluating an XPath expression of size n on a document of size d. Gottlob et al. [26] have shown that for CoreXPath (i.e., X without union and test) it is f (|σ | , |T |) = O(|σ | × |T |). We extend their result to X without test and with a factor of T to the full X fragment. Let |σ | be the size of the largest XPath expression in the range of σ . Then
Lemma 1 Every XPath query p ∈ X NoTest over a document T can be evaluated in time O(| p| × |T |).
Proof The proof follows the line of Gottlob et al. [26] for the CoreXPath fragment (that is without union of paths): we use the functions S → , S ← , and E to compute a query tree which is then evaluated bottom-up to yield the desired complexity result.
For the full fragment considered here, the naive implementation of union would lead to an exponential blow-up because the processing of
To avoid this blow-up we use a query DAG instead of a query tree. Each path of the form
is mapped into a (single source) rooted DAG in which the root is labeled ∪ with two children, one corresponding to the root of S → [| p 2 |] (X ) and one corresponding to the root of S → [| p 3 |] (X ). The shared X leaf node is the root of the
Formally, this is equivalent to say that
is evaluated using the symbolic rightmost lazy evaluation. In other words,
For 
Definition 11
A valid security view is one for which the semantics are always well-defined, i.e., if for every document T , its materialized version conforms to the security view DTD.
Not all views are valid: wrong typing, violated cardinality constraints, and other problems could be all causes of a view to be invalid. For example, in the case of loosened DTD, authorized XML view is not valid since the loosened DTD may contain (optional) element types that in XML document should be deleted and their children should be attached to permitted parents. However, the semantics of an optional element assumes that the absence of the element means the absence of the subtree rooted at that element. Consequently, the authorized XML view does not conform to the loosened DTD. To resolve this problem, Damiani et al. [17] proposed to delete only those forbidden nodes that do not have permitted descendants. This means that, sometimes, the user is allowed to see the information that is not permitted. The views that we construct from an annotated DTD are valid (see Sect. 7) and reveal all and only permitted information.
Security specification and views are related as follows.
Definition 12
Let (D, ann) be an authorization specification, and let S = (D v , σ ) be a security view for D. S is data equivalent to (D, ann) iff for every document T conforming to D, the materialized version T S is isomorphic to the authorized version T A .
Two weaker characterizations are based on the notion of data secrecy and data availability. 
S guarantees data secrecy iff for every T conforming to
D, and for every node n of T , if n occurs in T S then n must also occur in the authorized tree T A . 2. S guarantees data availability iff for every T conforming to D, and every node n of T , if n occurs in the authorized tree T A then n occurs in the materialized version T S .
Intuitively, a secrecy-preserving view insures that no forbidden node is leaked, whereas an availability-preserving view is a guarantee that no permitted node is withheld from legitimate users. Obviously, data equivalence implies secrecy and availability, but the converse does not hold since a data equivalent view also "preserves the structure" of the original document.
Given a security view S = (D v , σ ) and document T conforming to a DTD D, we give an algorithm constructing T S in Fig. 11 .
Proposition 3 If S = (D v , σ ) is a valid view for D, then the result of Algorithm Materialize is a document T S that is the materialized version of T .
Proof To prove the proposition, we must show that all three conditions of Definition 10.
In lines 7-12 algorithm evaluates σ (A, B i ), i = 1, . . . , m at any non-visited node n of type A in T SṪ he result of this evaluation is a set of nodes of types B 1 , . . . , B m that become children of node n. The order of children of type B i is the
The second condition holds obviously, because the algorithm constructs T S from T . Consequently, the nodes of T S are a subset of T . In addition, the algorithm neither changes the names of element types nor adds new ones.
Finally, since we assume that D v is valid, and any node n of type A in T S has children of types P(A), it is clear that T S conforms to D v . Thus, the first condition holds.
View construction for top-down policies
We now show how to construct a security view, given a DTD document and an authorization specification. The derivation of D v has two parts: (i) computing D F such that Y/N labels are assigned to every element type, and (ii) restructuring D F so that N-labeled elements are deleted and their permitted children are attached to their nearest permitted ancestors. In this manner, the view DTD D v shows all, and only, the accessible data. The first part may use various propagation techniques (top-down, bottom-up, among siblings, etc.) and conflict resolution rules (denial or permission takes precedence, qualifier over Y takes precedence and vice versa, explicitly defined label takes precedence over propagated one, priorities among access control rules applicable to the element, etc.) or may impose some default value on unlabeled elements.
Since we put annotations on DTD edges (generators), the idea behind our algorithm is to "push" security labels from generators to destination types. ann(s, d) , is defined and equals a, we say that s transmits (or propagates) annotation a to d via g.
Definition 14 If
Having obtained an annotation, a destination type, in its turn, becomes a source type and may transmit its annotation to its children (new destination types) via corresponding generators that were initially unlabeled (thus preserving most specific takes precedence condition).
Example 10 In Fig. 8 , there is an annotation ann(recomm-letter, letter)=N. It means that recomm-letter is a source transmitting N to a destination letter. The type letter obtains annotation N , becomes a source for favorable and unfavorable, and transmits N to them.
Since an annotation can be presented as a qualifier, the algorithm, first of all, eliminates qualifiers. For this purpose, it expands each of them into a union of two element types: one is the original element type, which is annotated Y, and the other is a new type, which is annotated N. Since the tag of an element uniquely determines the type, it follows that new type names cannot match any nodes in a document that conforms to the original DTD. This is not a serious problem, as We must emphasize that the semantics of qualifiers in Fan et al. [22] is different from ours. In particular, qualifiers in Fan et al. [22] have precedence over Y labels. This means that it is impossible to express "global" accessibility of a DTD element (like the accessibility of department fields in the current motivating example). In other words, every Y label guarantees accessibility if positive result of evaluating existing qualifiers for ancestors takes place. The advantage of such semantics is a succinctness of policy representation, it is enough to assign Y to (unreliable, recomm-letter) instead of Q[q 2 ] as in motivating example. However, we allow true overriding of qualifiers while authors of Fan et al. [22] don't. Another issue is related to the emulation of security policy in the XML document: the method of Fan et al. [22] simply prunes XML at the node where qualifier does not hold. This is somewhat similar to denial downward consistency of Gabillon and Bruno [23] , Qi and Kudo [40] . On the other hand, unconditional Y may still override unconditional N in Fan et al. [22] . We believe that our interpretation of qualifiers and the notion of visible/invisible nodes we emulate is a step beyond this confusion.
Example 11
In Fig. 12 , we demonstrate what happens to the edge (applications, application) with an annotation Q[student-data/id = $login]. Namely, we split application into a visible application Y , which is a normal application, and invisible application N , which should be deleted afterwards. Both newly created elements have the same set of parents and the same set of children. For any child, the newly created element transmits the same annotation as the old one. For each parent, we construct a σ -function describing the situation when qualifier holds for the visible node, and the situation when qualifier does not hold for the invisible. The latter is equivalent to the situation when a negation of the initial qualifier holds. . Regarding the last one, elements rating and free-text should be split twice because of the sources favorable and unfavorable transmitting qualifier. However, there will be always two kinds of newly created nodes, visible and invisible. Hence, we can either reuse elements created previously, or merge multiple elements of the same visibility into a unique element.
After removing qualifiers, the next step expands the annotation to a "full annotation" by propagating the remaining Y and N labels. The idea is simple: if all incoming edges of some destination element have the same annotation Y or N this element becomes visible or invisible, respectively, and transmits this annotation to its children. It is easy to see that every XML document has a unique full annotation [22] . At the schema level, however, this is not the case, as there may be several "paths" in the DTD that reach the same element type, each of which results in a different annotation. We use a similar technique when we handle qualifiers, i.e., we introduce new element types, and label the original one with Y (emulation of a visible node), which is connected with parents transmitting to it Y, and the "copy" with N (emulation of an invisible node), which is connected to parents transmitting to it N. The function σ between parents and newly created nodes is simply the name of the split element. This is because the invisible copy will be deleted, while the visible one will be considered as the original one. The newly created nodes transmit their visibility to their children.
Example 12
Elements application Y and application N transmit, respectively, Y and N to student-data. The latter should be split into visible and invisible copies, i.e., student-data Y and student-data N , children of annotation Y and annotation N respectively. The σ -function in both cases is equal to student-data. The newly created elements are connected to all children of student-data and transmit to them corresponding visibility. However, since ann(student-data, department)=Y, which is more specific, Y overrides negative visibility transmitted by student -data N .
An overall algorithm for top-down policy propagation is shown in Fig. 13 . In particular, lines 4-11 of Annotate View algorithm perform splitting nodes when removing qualifier (Definition 15). Steps 12-27 perform a top-down propagation with splitting (lines [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] [26] [27] . The result of Annotate View execution is a fully annotated DTD. Having obtained a fully annotated DTD, we delete all the element types that are labeled N, modifying the regular expressions and the σ functions accordingly. This is shown in the Build View algorithm in Fig. 14.
Definition 16 DTD is called fully annotated if for every DTD node A, there is a defined function ann data (A)
:
Example 13
In Example 12, department is reachable via two paths: In the path p 2 , there are two elements that should be deleted: application N and student-data N . Since all permitted children should be connected to all permitted parents, an additional edge between applications and department is created and σ (applications, department) = application[¬(studentdata/id = $login)]/student-data/department that is exactly XP 5 from Example 8. 
Schema-level access for bottom-up policies
In the previous section, we showed how to construct the view for the top-down policy. In the case of local policy, we suppose that ann(A, B) is an annotation between parent A and its child B. Therefore, pushing of security labels is performed in a top-down manner. This approach assures that there will not be any conflicts at XML tree since every node B will have only one parent A, i.e., only one generator. Hence, we can consider local policy to be subsumed by top-down policy. Note that we can push annotation bottom-up from children to a parent. However, in this case, the VC option must be defined. Consequently, local policy class will be subsumed by bottom-up policy. Finally, the multilabel policy requires application of both local and hierarchical (top-down or bottom-up) policies. Therefore, we say that multilabel policy is also subsumed by top-down and bottom-up policies and in this section, we can restrict the attention to bottom-up policy only.
First, the definition of authorization specification is extended as follows: all generators of the authorization specification are of one type: either top-down or bottom-up edges.
Definition 17 Element types A and B of DTD D are called adjacent if one of the following statements is true: (i) B ∈ P(A) of a production rule A → P(A), or (ii) A ∈ P(B) of a production rule B → P(B).
In the case (i), a DTD edge (A, B) is a top-down edge; otherwise, it is a bottom-up edge.
We then can generalize the semantics of qualifiers at the DTD level as follows:
Definition 18 The semantics of ann(s, d) = Q[q] is a splitting of node type d into two ones having the following meaning: visible node instance of type d is visible if child(s, d)[q]
holds, and invisible otherwise, where child(s, d) is a function that for generator (s, d) that returns a child element type ch = s ∨ d with respect to a DTD structure, i.e., for some element type U = ch, U ∈ {s, d}, DTD should have a production rule U → P(U ) such that ch ∈ P(U ). 4 
From the top-down view point, the destination d is visible if d[q] (d is a child) holds. On the other hand, from the bottom-up view point, d is visible if s[q] (s is a child)
holds. The last interpretation of qualifier seems strange but it is required in such a form because σ -function evaluation and view materialization is held in a top-down manner. Namely, σ (A, B) = Q means that Q should be evaluated at B; in the XML view, B children of A are extracted according to Q.
As in the top-down approach we push security annotations along edges, but from children to parents. In this case, we must take into account, that an analogous operation in the XML tree for any destination may have multiple sources.
Example 14
Consider the DTD from Example 1. Generators (student-data, name) and (evaluator, name) differently transmit annotation to name in the sense that a node of type name may have a parent of type student-data or evaluator. Hence, these generators cannot influence on ann data (name) simultaneously. If we consider a bottomup case, generators (title, evaluator) and (institution, evaluator) influence on ann data (evaluator) simultaneously because any node of type evaluator has both children of types institution and title in any XML instance. However, this is not a case for generators (MS, rating) and (PhD, rating) influencing on ann data (rating) non-simultaneously as long as a node of type rating has either a child of type MS or a child of type PhD. Suppose, we are given an authorization specification (D, ann). We denote the set of all generators of d as G(d).
Definition 19 We say that a subset of G(d) denoted as G(d) has a simultaneous influence on ann data (d) if there exists T conforming to D such that every instance of type d has a set of either outgoing or incoming edges corresponding to the set G(d). We call G(d) a set of simultaneous influence (SSI).
As we have seen earlier, a node may have several SSIs. This means that different nodes of the same element type in the same XML document may have different full annotation ann data . Hence, we split an element w.r.t. a set of sources rather than a single source.
Definition 20 We say that d obtains a preliminary full annotation
The notion of PFA is introduced (i) to reflect the possibility of a node obtaining either a positive or a negative full annotation, and (ii) to take into account the fact that any node may have multiple sources. Obviously, if ann(g) is the same for
Otherwise, to resolve a conflict within an SSI, we use VC resolution option if it is defined. 5 Value conflict may arise only in the case of bottom-up policy class because every XML instance usually contains a node having more than one child.
In the definition of PFA, we required that ann(g) = Q[q]. This is because the first step of the algorithm should be removing qualifier according to Definition 18. Let us consider an example of removing qualifiers while propagating security annotations bottom-up. First of all, as 5 If VC option is not defined, the view does not exist. Example 15 In Fig. 15 , unreliable Y is connected to both its sources, since recomm-letter transmits Y due to qualifier evaluation, reason transmits nothing. On the other hand, unreliable N is connected only to recomm-letter that transmits N. 
Example 16 In Fig. 15 , we show in boxes a σ between the newly created nodes and their sources that are children. Note that now ann(recomm-letter, unreliable Y )=Y and ann(recomm-letter, unreliable N )=N as in top-down case.
Fig. 16 Algorithm Qualifier Removing
The procedure for removing qualifier is depicted in Fig. 16 . Having removed qualifiers, we can define SSIs. For topdown propagation, SSIs contain only one generator (parent-child DTD edge), and the number of SSIs is equal to the number of parents in DTD graph. The situation is more complicated in bottom-up propagation. First of all, every destination element type d may have several children in the DTD graph transmitting their security labels to d. Second, the number of SSIs and their components depend on the presence of choices (α + α) in P(A). More precisely, if we present every sequence (α, α) of P(A) as an arithmetic product (α × α), and every choice (α + α) of P(A) as an arithmetic sum in parenthesis, then the precise number of SSIs and their configuration is, respectively, the number of components and Next, for every SSI, we calculate a preliminary full annotation using the VC option if necessary (e.g., in the case of bottom-up policy class). If different SSIs deliver to d different annotations, we perform the same splitting operation as in the case of qualifier removed. Finally, if all PFAs are the same, then ann data of the destination node is clearly defined. Otherwise, as we mentioned earlier, we perform a splitting operation w.r.t. SSIs transmitting different PFAs.
Example 19
If in the previous example VC = denialT akes Precedence, we have different PFAs: Y from S 1 and N from S 2 . Consequently, we split rating into a visible and an invisible version. Otherwise, we assign Y as ann data (rating).
The generic splitting algorithm (valid for top-down and bottom-up polices) is shown in Fig. 17 .
We assume that every DTD element type e that is required to be initially annotated (like root or all leaves for bottom-up propagation) automatically retransmits its annotation to all generators g = (e, d ) such that ann(g) = ∅.
The generic algorithm Annotate View is shown in Fig 18. It starts with a preprocessing procedure which is needed only for the local policy. After preprocessing and qualifier removal steps, we use a queue: if the next considered element type d has a full annotation ann data (d), there is no need to process it; otherwise, the algorithm returns to line 2. If all generators of d are annotated, then we decide ann data (d). Otherwise, we place d back to queue (step 17).
Theoretical results
Theorem 2 Let (D, ann) be a security specification where D is non-recursive. Algorithms terminate and produce valid security views.
Proof First, we prove that the algorithms. Indeed, in Annotate View, there are two sources of iteration: the first is step 2 which terminates because the number of qualifiers is finite, the second one is the cycle while starting in line 4 that extends the annotation to a "full" one where ann data is defined as either Y or N for every element type. Suppose that the algorithm never reaches the state when queue is empty (i.e., does not terminate). It may happen if every Fig. 18 Algorithm Annotate View element of queue is expecting a full annotation. 6 Consider one such an element type e having a source s k+1 such that ann data (s k+1 ) = ∅ which is also expecting. Inductively, we suppose that s k+1 has an expecting source s k+2 , etc. Therefore, in the DTD graph, there exists either an infinite path or a cycle s k+n , . . . , s k+2 , s k+1 , e, s k+n of expecting element types that is a contradiction. Therefore, this while terminates.
The algorithm Build View always terminates because a fully annotated DTD contains a finite set of N-labeled nodes. Hence, the first step in Build View always reduces the number of element types in the DTD by one.
Second, we show that D v is a DTD. D v would fail to be a DTD only if, for some element type A ∈ D v , there exists B ∈ P(A) such that B was deleted in step 6 of Build View. Since B is deleted by Build View ann data (B) in a fully annotated DTD D F must be equal to N, and therefore B is replaced by P(B) in step 6 of Build View. Hence, B cannot occur in P(A), a contradiction. As we are considering only non-recursive DTDs, we must also show that the new DTD is non-recursive. But this follows immediately, as any cycle D v can be traced back to a cycle in D.
Finally, we prove that the resulting security view is valid. For this purpose, we must show that T S conforms to D v . To do this, we first examine T F which is the fully annotated version of T , and D F which is the fully annotated DTD. At this point, we would like to show that T F conforms to D F , but there is a problem, namely that some of the nodes in T F should be typed by element types in D F because of removing qualifier and splitting. To have them typed appropriately, we extend the notion of typing so that the new types will also match the corresponding old type from which they are generated. Namely, we allow each new element type B Y or B N to type the same nodes that were typed by B. With this modified definition of typing, a node in T F that is annotated N (resp. Y) will be typed by a type in D F that is annotated N (resp. Y). Since all the new nodes are deleted at step 6 of Build View the new definition of typing reduces to the standard definition, completing the proof. Now we need a technical lemma that will be used to prove Theorem 3. (D, ann) be a security specification where D  is a not-recursive DTD and (D v , σ ) 
Lemma 3 Let
Proof The proof is by a nested induction on n and the number of iterations of step 5 of algorithm Build View.
Base case: n = 1, then B 1 is a child of B 0 . There are two cases: (1) ann(B 0 , B 1 )=N, and (2) ann(B 0 , B 1 )=Q[q] . In the first case, σ (B 0 , B 1 )=B 1 because of initialization step of Annotate View algorithm. In the second case, before step 5 of Build View is executed, algorithm Annotate View would set σ (B 0 , B 1 ) = B 1 [q 1 ] for a suitable qualifier q 1 . Therefore, up to this point, the theorem holds by setting p = B, q 1 = ∅ in the first case and p = ∅ in the second case. During step 6 of algorithm Build View it is possible that the elimination of some N-children of B 0 would modify σ (B 0 , B 1 ) . Namely, it may happen if B has a child C which, in its turn has a child B 1 . In this case, we get
where q 1 may be ∅. If B 1 itself is eliminated from P(B 0 ) this would not change the selection function constructed so far for B 1 .
For the inductive case, let B 0 , . . . , B n be the sequence of nodes and let B i for i ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1} be the last node that is eliminated by step 5 of the algorithm Build View. Since the DTD is not recursive neither σ (B 0 , B i ), nor σ (B i , B n ) can be changed by this step. Without the loss of generality, let ann(B i , B i+1 )=Q[q] for some 0 ≤ i < n. We put q i+1 = ∅ if needed. Then, by evaluating the S → operator and by induction hypothesis we get
The case i = n is similar to the above one by combining the reasoning for the base case and the aforementioned intermediate case.
Remark 1 In this lemma, there is no condition on the labeling of either B 0 or B n as this would make the induction hypothesis needed for the proof not strong enough. Equally we need to quantify over all sets N or the composition of two intermediate sequences during the induction step would not have an inductive hypothesis strong enough.
Theorem 3 Let (D, ann) be an authorization specification, where D is non-recursive, and (D v , σ ) is the security view constructed by algorithms Annotate View and Build View. Let T be a document, T A the authorized version of T and T S the materialized version of T with respect to (D v , σ ).
Then T A is isomorphic to T S .
Proof The proof is by top-down induction on T . The root of T is clearly in both T A and T S . By induction, assume that n is of element type A, and is found in both T A and T S . We must show that each child n in T A is also a child of n in T S , and vice versa. in T A , each ann(B i−1 , B 
with some of the q i 's absent, when ann(
is accessible from n in T via path σ (A, B) ), as desired.
⇐ For the converse, let m be a child of n in T S . We must show that m is a child of n in T A .
From the definition of T S , m must be present in the result of evaluating σ (A, B) at n. Let n = n 0 , n 1 , …, n k , m = n k+1 (k ≥ 0) be the shortest path from n to m that is used in the evaluation of the σ function. We claim that n i+1 is accessible from n i present in T via the path σ (
If n i+1 were in the second disjunct above, we would have a contradiction with the assumption that our path was the shortest. Therefore n i+1 must be accessible from n i in T by the path σ (B i , B i+1 ). Therefore for 0
is either N or undefined. The case ann( 
In both cases, it follows that n, n 1 , …, n k , m is a path in T . It remains to be shown that n 1 , …, n k are deleted in T A . For nodes inheriting a qualifier via some source, this is immediate; for the other nodes it follows from the fact that the algorithm used to define a complete annotation is the same in the definition of T A and in Algorithm Annotate View.
Experimental results
The overall experimentation schema consists of two parts. The first part is to measure scalability an degradation of performance of DTD view construction. The second part shows advantages of schema-based policy enforcement over instance-based one.
All experiments were held on a working station with 4 CPU Intel Xeon CPUs of 3.20 GHz, 4 GB of RAM, and RedHat Linux ES 3 as an operating system.
Scalability
We selected five DTDs from http://www.xml.org/xml/ schema/ of different sizes: 24, 79, 211, 802, 2303 edges. For every DTD, we generated 100 times a file containing 1, 2, . . ., {24, 79, 211, 802, 2303} Y and N labels assigned randomly. For every generated annotation file, we constructed a corresponding DTD view and measured wall-time required for the construction. Scatter-plot diagrams are shown in Fig. 19 .
Most of scatter plots demonstrate the same behavior: increasing at the beginning and stabilization (constant time required for view construction) to the end. Increasing is expected: the more security labels we have, the more splitting and deleting operations may be required. In particular, there may be an effect of "cascading" splitting, when a subgraph of the DTD should be split at every node that goes below the node that was split first. For example, if element type recomm -letter in the DTD from our motivating example is split and no other security label goes below that node, the whole subgraph rooted at recomm-letter will be split in a cascading manner, because both original element type and its copy are connected to the children of the original element type while transmitting different security annotations (Y and N respectively).
However, at some point, DTD view construction time obtains a constant nature, i.e., it does not increase with the growth of the number of security labels. Moreover, the time variation becomes smaller. It may be explained by the fact that the number of splitting operations reduces in spite of possible conflicts between annotations that require splitting. If we imagine again recomm-letter that should be split, but there are other security labels assigned to edges below that element type, it becomes clear that cascading splittings take place not for all underlying element types.
At this point, we have to mention a particular scatter plot on Fig. 19d . At the beginning there are two branches. The lower branch has the same behavior as in the other scatter plots. The upper branch corresponds to, at least, two times bigger values than the lower one. However, the upper branch tends to descend to the level when there are no differences between two branches. Such a strange scatter plot is explained by a complicated structure of a DTD, i.e., with multiple destinations having many sources. In this case, the lower branch corresponds to cascading splittings in a subgraph that has a smaller number of multi-source element types, while the upper branch represents label propagation in more complicated parts of DTD which require extremely time-consuming cascading splits in the presence of a small number of security labels. However, as we have seen earlier, cascading splits diminish if we have more security labels. As the scatter plot on Fig. 19d , this also holds for graphs with complicated structure.
Finally, the scalability scatter plot is shown in Fig. 20 . As it can be seen, if the number of DTD edges increases by 1,000 times, DTD view construction time increases only by 10-15 times. Thus, we may conclude that our method is scalable. Moreover, the degradation of performance is not significant with respect to the number of either DTD edges or security labels.
Policy enforcement performance: schema-based versus instance-based
The next step was to measure a performance of a view-based XML materialization and its comparison with a naïve one (corresponds to Definition 4). For this purpose, we used XMark benchmark [1] to generate 20 different XML documents of size from 1MB to 9.5MB. For all these XML documents, we applied Materialize algorithm that was invoked for every DTD view constructed for auctions.dtd above (total: 7900 views with a different number of security labels in the initial annotation). The scatter-plot of such a materialization is shown in Fig. 21a . Here we have to note that, in order to make experiments repeatable, we used a standard Xalan XPath evaluator by Apache which leads to exponential blow-up. Although there have been provided polynomial algorithms of XPath evaluation [27] , their implementation is done as a C++ tool 7 rather than a Java library. We tried to run the same set of experiments for a naïve materialization, when annotations are propagated directly on XML document. However, around 30 hours were taken to run 100 experiments only for the case of a single security label in the initial DTD annotation. The result is shown in Fig. 21b . A significant difference between two approaches from the view point of "compactness" of materialization time can be noticed. In other words, the view-based materialization time for the same XML document does not vary much from experiment to experiment. On the other hand, naïve materialization time has an enormous variation. This variation is caused by the presence of qualifiers of the form [ parent:: parent N ame] that are inevitable in the presence of destinations with multiple sources (which is true for auctions.dtd).
There is a big gap between performance of naïve materialization experiments and view-based materialization experiments due to the fact about qualifiers described above. However, in rare cases, naïve materialization is faster than view-based one. It happens in the cases when XML tree has (one) Y label, or (one) N label assigned to a leaf. In other words, these fast results take place because of easy annotations. However, we must note that, in the case of faster naïve rather than view-based materialization, the difference between results is not of more than 3-5 s which can be considered as negligible from the view point of the overall performance comparison. 7 http://www.dbai.tuwien.ac.at/research/xmltaskforce/. 
Query answering issues
We started this paper with an argument that DTD view is required for the user in order to alleviate query formulation over accessible data. In this section, we briefly provide different options of query answering over materialized view from the view point of materialization performance and space required for a storage of materialized views.
Option 0: Materialize XML views on the fly by a naïve method. In this option, we store only DTD and security annotations corresponding to different classes of users. Security labels are expressed usually as x path, Y|N (see [7, 10, 17, 23, 25, 32, 36] ) where x path is an XPath expression (possibly with qualifiers) that after evaluation returns all the nodes to which Y or N label should be assigned. It means that simple XML labeling can be extremely time-consuming operation because of (i) multiple XPath evaluations, and (ii) the presence of qualifiers in XPaths.
Option 1: Store materialized XML views. This option is very attractive for query evaluation performance: the user simply submits a query which is evaluated over a related XML view. The big disadvantages of this approach are (i) integrity maintenance of all views in the case of updates in the original XML document is error-prone and unfeasible;
(ii) XML view is usually 20-40% smaller than the original XML document. In the case of a large number of user classes, a very large disk space will be required to store all those views. The situation can be aggravated in the case of views that contain personal data. It means that in such a situation, we cannot even define classes of views: every user will require a personal view.
Option 2: Store DTD views and materialize XML views on the fly. As we have seen earlier, there are not so many cases when view-based materialization is slower than a naïve one. Moreover, even if such a case takes place, the difference in results is negligible. On the other hand, the overall time for view-based materialization is not more than 20 s in all our experiments. Certainly, this result will grow exponentially with an increase of XML size. However, if we apply polynomial algorithms of XPath evaluation, this measure will be decreased significantly. And thus, we can consider this option as acceptable even in the case of interactive web-applications. To this end, we have to remember about space consumption which is reduced drastically because (i) DTD view is much smaller than XML view (while D v +σ is more or less of the same size as the initial DTD document), (ii) the same DTD view can express conditions that allows to extract different personal data for each single user.
Option 3: Construct DTD view and materialize XML view on the fly. At this point, we recall that DTD view construction can be considered as of constant time. Hence as in Option 0, we store a DTD with a set of security annotations which requires small space. On the other hand, DTD view construction plus XML materialization by Materialize algorithm on the fly has an acceptable performance.
Finally, the overall query answering can be improved by introducing a cache that stores frequently asked views. Another approach may exploit query rewriting technique when a user query over the DTD view is rewritten into an equivalent query over the initial XML document [22] . Both these issues are under investigation.
Related work
A typical approach to specifying and enforcing access control for traditional databases is to define views on which security permissions should be applied (e.g., multi-level security view for a relational database [35, 41, 43, 48] , discretionary access control over relational databases [6] and object-oriented databases [11] ). For instance, Lunt et al. [34] showed how to use standard SQL queries to implement the SeaView multilevel secure database. It is simple to define a relational view via an SQL query, and derive the relational schema of the view. In contrast, the hierarchical structure and the dependency (e.g., ancestor and descendants) of XML data as well as the presence of disjunction and recursion in DTDs make it impossible to define a security view via a single query, and moreover, they introduce new challenges in how to generate a view that conforms to a view DTD. The challenges were observed in [4] , which showed that even for XML views of relational data, it is highly nontrivial to ensure that the views typecheck. This observation has been further confirmed in [2] which showed that type checking of XML views of relational data, even for simple DTDs, is computationally intractable: co-NEXPTIME for extremely restricted view definitions, and undecidable for realistic views.
The insight to construct XML security views was found in [41] where it was demonstrated how to compute a full database labelling from a partial one implied by security views. From the XML viewpoint, a partial assignment of security labels to XML document nodes can be also extended to a full assignment. From the latter, it is easy to compute an XML analogue of relational view by means of "sanitization" operation which hides (e.g., deletes or encrypts) nodes with negative authorizations, but reveals (e.g., moves up to a permitted ancestor in the case of deletion of a forbidden parent) their permitted children [7, 17, 23, 32] . In the following sections, we will give an overview of these and other security models of access control to XML documents.
Runtime policy evaluation
The general scenario of the current category of proposals is the following: The system defines a set of access control rules of the form sub ject, object, action, sign where subject is self-explaining, object is an XML element/attribute expressed by XPath, action is typically read/write, sign∈ {+, −}. Different conflict resolution rules and default policy are established as well. With respect to user's request req_sub ject, req_object, req_action , access control rules applicable to req_subject is selected, their signs for req_action are propagated to req_object. Hence, permission is granted to the user if the resulting sign on req_object is +; otherwise, the access is denied.
In particular, [32] introduces the notion of provisional authorization, when some provisional action (e.g., logging, transcoding) is performed according to the user's request.
The proposal of [10] considers the case when the access control is moved to clients, e.g., secure tokens and smart cards that are used as trust components in different mobile devices (e.g., PC, PDA, cellular phone) participating in applications dealing with sensitive information (e.g., certification, authentication, electronic voting, e-payment, health care, digital right management, etc.).
Several papers consider the case of evolving access control policies expressed in XQuery [25] and by means of RDF [3, 28] . Such policies can be used for a derivation of new access control rules including content-based constraints of requested and other documents, environmental information like time and place of request initiator,and information about possessed privileges. As a result, hardcoding rules for each document and its parts are no more necessary. This feature is especially valuable for systems with dynamic XML documents and requesters' population.
Run-time policy evaluation can be accelerated by efficient lookup of compressed accessibility map where compression is performed on objects [51] , on objects and actions [30] , on objects, subjects and actions [52] .
Another direction for improving runtime policy evaluation concerns static analysis of user queries [39] , integration of policy into user query [36] , matching user query against efficient policy representation as a tree [40] . In the case when mandatory access control is considered, recursive checks can be reduced by adding special predicates to node tests in the user query [14] .
An association between XML nodes can be hidden either at the stage of policy definition [28] or after detecting the possibility of information leakage in security view [49] .
An optimization for efficient twig query evaluation in the presence of mandatory access control security annotation is proposed in [14] .
Finally, access control for XML documents can be strengthened with role-based concepts [47] .
Security views for XML
The scenario for this group of proposals is to extract an authorized XML view which includes data relevant to the user's clearance: access control rules applicable to the user are used to partially type the XML tree with Y (+) and N (−) labels. After that, partial annotation is extended to full one. Finally, fully annotated label is sanitized, i.e., Nlabeled elements are either deleted completely [7, 23] or modified [17] .
A different approach to XML security views was shown in [45] where there was an attempt to define a security view by a single XPath expression. In a nutshell, XML elements matching non-asterisk location steps of XPath are added to a view, while asterisks represent forbidden parts of the XML.
Cryptographically enforced access control
Cryptographically enforced access control is exploited in socalled push architecture, when all users have the same document but each user extracts own view according to a set of possessed keys.
XML encryption pool is presented in Geuer-Pollmann [24] . Namely, the method of Damiani et al. [18] is used to define permitted and forbidden nodes and the approach of Bertino et al. [8] to associate keys with nodes. The nodes with a restricted access are then excluded from the view and are attached to the document in encrypted form as a pool. The pool also stores the information about the original location of a hidden node and a set of associated keys.
The approach in Bertino and Ferrari [9] is based on Bertino et al. [7] . It avoids generation of multiple physical views for each use by means of different keys for encrypting different portions of the same document. One and only one key is responsible for encryption of each portion of the source XML document. To minimize the number of encryption keys, the portions of the document protected with the same set of policies are encrypted with the same keys. The consequent scenario is key distribution and periodical broadcast of the encrypted document.
Miklau and Suciu extend the Bertino's idea of secure and selective dissemination of XML documents with the notion of conditional access control rules [37] , which generalizes the term "subject", i.e., authorization is based not on network identifier or user name, but on knowledge presented by the user.
The ideas of Bertino and Ferrari [9] and Miklau and Suciu [37] are refined and extended with RBAC in Crampton [16] .
Nowadays, push architecture is investigated from the view point of secure outsourcing when not only the users but also document holders are distrusted [13, 29, 42, 46, 50] .
Schema-based security views
Stoica and Farkas [44] proposed to produce single-level views of XML when conforming DTD is annotated by labels of different confidentiality levels. The key idea lies in analyzing semantic correlation between element types, modification of initial structure of DTD and using cover stories. Altered DTD then undergoes "filtering" when only element types of the confidentiality level no higher than the requester's one are extracted. However, the proposal requires expert's analysis of semantic meaning of production rules, and this can be unacceptable if database contains a large amount of schemas which are changed occasionally.
Another view-based approach is proposed by Fan et al. [22] . In this paper, we underlined the similarities and the differences with our approach. Here we summarize the proposal of Fan et al. [22] . The process of an access control policies enforcement can be described as follows: (1) define access specification for each class of users, (2) derive a sound and complete DTD security view for a particular access specification, (3) supply the user with a corresponding security DTD view, (4) user issues a query in terms of kept DTD view, (5) a query over the view schema is rewritten to a query over the initial schema and optimized, (6) the optimized query is evaluated over the XML and the result is returned to the requester.
The latest approach to schema-based security views was presented in Mohan et al. [38] . The solution allows a complete restructuring of a DTD and relies on a command-like specification language. However, it was mentioned in Mohan et al. [38] that many operations are not commutative and have restrictions that means a possibility of errors while designing access control policies.
Discussion
Two main drawbacks can be easily observed in the first group of run-time policy evaluation scenarios. The first one is that for every user request, accessibility of an XML node is calculated via a propagation of security annotations which may involve the whole tree. The second drawback is that the user is supplied with neither a schema of available data nor an XML view.
The second group of proposals slightly alleviates the aforementioned problems: an XML view is calculated only once and may be queried by the user locally. However, a meaningful DTD schema is still missing. The same is related to crypto-proposals; the difference is that the user may extract the view locally as well if he has a set of corresponding keys.
The group of schema-based view proposals seems to provide the most promising solutions. Namely, the proposal by Stoica and Farkas [44] can construct views that preserve semantic meaning among element types of the original DTD which is missing in more recent proposals [22, 33] . However, this proposal still needs to be evolved in the sense that it is not clear how the constructed view can be used for XML querying. Some intuiting on a possible evolution can be seen in Fan et al. [22] (query rewriting) and Kuper et al. [33] (view materialization). Finally, the latest proposal in schema-based views was published in Mohan et al. [38] . Their querying language is based on XQuery rather than on XPath. However, we have some doubts about the practical applicability of the method due to its error-prone nature while policy designing and modification.
Conclusions
This paper elaborates on certain issues left open in Fan et al. [22] . In particular, we studied access control and security specifications defined over general DTDs in terms of regular expressions rather than normalized DTDs of Fan et al. [22] . Furthermore, we developed a new algorithm for deriving a security view definition from more intuitive access control specification (w.r.t. a non-recursive DTD) without introducing dummy element types, and thus preventing inference of sensitive information from the XML structure revealed by dummies. In addition, we provided an extension of a view derivation algorithm in a bottom-up direction. Other our contributions include the study of different access control policies and experimental evaluation of DTD view construction for Y|N labels and view-based versus naïve materialization.
The former shows that our method is scalable and has an unessential degradation tending to become constant with the growth of the number of annotations. The latter demonstrates advantages of view-based approach over a naïve one from the view point of both performance and space consumption.
Several extensions to the security model are targeted for the future work. First, we plan to extend the definitions of security views and authorization specifications by supporting more complex XML Schema [21] instead of DTDs. Second, we are also studying extensions of our algorithm for deriving security-view definitions with respect to recursive DTDs/schemas. In addition, our next step toward enforcing inference control will be to investigate reasoning techniques in the presence of integrity constraints and ID/IDREF attributes. The observation concerning leakage of information in the case where the security specifications are not closed under intersection is left for the future work. Finally, we are studying a query evaluation in the presence of a query rewriting use case.
